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Abstract—User location data collected on Geo-Social Networking
applications (GeoSNs) can be used to enhance the services
provided by such applications. However, personal location in-
formation can potentially be utilised for undesirable purposes
that can compromise users’ privacy. This paper presents a study
of privacy implications of location-based information provision
and collection on user awareness and behaviour when using
GeoSNs. The dimensions of the problem are analysed and
used to guide an analytical study of some representative data
sets from such applications. The results of the data analysis
demonstrate the extent of potential personal information that may
be derived from the location information. In addition, a survey is
undertaken to examine user awareness, concerns and subsequent
attitude and behaviour given knowledge of the possible derived
information. The results clearly demonstrate users’ needs for
improving their knowledge, access and visibility of their data sets
as well as for means to control and manage their location data.
Future work needs to investigate the current state of personal
data management on GeoSNs and how their interfaces may be
improved to satisfy the highlighted users’ needs and to protect
their privacy.
Keywords–location privacy; Geo-social networks; mobility pat-
terns; privacy concerns.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation and affordablity of GPS-enabled devices
are enabling individuals to accumulate an increasing amount of
personal information, such as their mobility tracks, geographi-
cally tagged photos and events. Embracing these new location-
aware capabilities by social networks has led to the emergence
of Geo-Social Networks (GeoSNs) that offer their users the
ability to geo-reference their submissions and to share their
location with other users. Subsequently, users can use location
identifiers to browse and search for resources. GeoSNs include
Location-Enabled Social Networks (LESNs), for example,
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Flickr, where users’ locations
are supplementary identification of other primary data sets,
and Location-Based Social Networks (LBSNs), for example,
Foursquare and Yelp, where location is an essential key for
providing the service.
In addition to location data that describe the place the
places visited by users, GeoSNs also records other personal
information, such as user’s friends, reviews and tips, possibly
over long periods of time. User’s historical location informa-
tion can be related to contextual and semantic information
publicly available online and can be used to infer personal
information and to construct a comprehensive user profile
[1], [2]. Derived information in such profiles can include
user activities, interests and mobility patterns [3], [4]. Such
enriched location-based profiles can be considered to be useful
if used to personalise and enhance the quality of the services
provided by the social networking applications. For example,
by recommending a place to visit on Foursquare and showing
local trends on Twitter. However, they can potentially be used
for undesirable purposes and can pose privacy threats ranging
from location-based spams to possible threats by an adversary
[5]. Users may not be fully aware of what location information
are being collected, how the information are used and by
whom, and hence can fail to appreciate the possible potential
risks of disclosing their location information.
In this paper, a study of location privacy of users when
using GeoSNs is presented. The aims are to investigate poten-
tial privacy implications of GeoSNs, as well as examine users’
privacy concerns and attitude when using these networks. We
demonstrate the privacy implications by identifying possible
derived information from typical data sets collected by LBSNs
for different types of users, as was shown in an earlier work
[1]. In addition, a survey was undertaken to gauge users’
understanding and reaction to possible types of privacy threats
resulting from the knowledge of their location information.
Firstly, the dimensions of the problem are examined and
the factors that can impact users’ privacy are identified. These
factors include, the type of data collected, its visibility and
accessibility by users, as well as the possible exploitation of
these data by the application. Secondly, an analytical study
is conducted using a representative data set to explore the
location data content and the range of possible inferences
that can be made from them. The frequency of usage of
the networking application is used to classify users and in
the analysis of their behavioural patterns. Finally, a survey
was undertaken to examine users’ awareness and concerns
with respect to privacy implications of their location data
and their needs to control access to their data on GeoSNs.
Previous studies explored users’ privacy concerns and attitude
when sharing their location for social purposes, but presented
limited evaluations using restricted application scenarios [6],
[7]. Questionnaire analysis demonstrate a strong feasibility
of inference of users’ personal information that may pose a
threat to their privacy on these networks. The survey also
reveals users’ concerns about their location privacy and their
motivation to control their location information. The outcomes
highlight the need for further work on improving the visibility
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of the information collected, to allow users to better understand
the implications of their location sharing activities and assess
their need to control access to their location data sets.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section
II gives an overview of related work. In Section III, the
dimensions of the location privacy problem in GeoSNs are
discussed. Section IV describes the experiment conducted with
a realistic data set to explore the spatiotemporal information
content explicitly described and that may be inferred from the
data. Section V builds on the results of Section IV by designing
and deploying a questionnaire that explores users’ awareness
and attitude towards potential privacy threats. Discussion of
the results and conclusions are presented in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Security and privacy of online social networks is a general
research area that includes evaluating potential privacy risks, as
well as developing privacy-protection methods [8], [9], [10].
This paper focuses on the privacy implications of location-
related information in GeoSNs. Two relevant questions to
the problem studied are: to what extent is location privacy
a potential concern for users in GeoSNs, and what sort of
location-based inference is possible from the data collected
in GeoSNs. In this section, related works on both issues are
reviewed.
A. Users’ Attitude and Privacy Concerns in Geo-Social Net-
works
Much interest has been witnessed over the past few years
for studying users’ attitude and concerns to location privacy
and investigating how user-empowered location privacy pro-
tection mechanisms can influence their behaviour. Tsai et al.
[6] developed a social location sharing application, where
participants were capable of specifying time-based rules to
share their location and were then notified of who viewed
their locations. Their findings suggested that the control given
to users for setting their sharing preferences contribute to the
reduction of the level of their privacy concern.
Sadeh et al. [7] enabled users of their People Finder
application to set rule-based location privacy controls by
determining the where, when and with whom to share their
location and were notified when their location information was
requested. Participants were initially reluctant to share their
location information and then tended to be more comfortable
over time. Patil et al. [11] developed a system to represent
actual users’ workplace, offering live feeds about users and
their location and asked users to define different levels of
permissions for their personal information sharing. They found
that participants were concerned most about their location
information and that they utilised the permission feature to
control this information. Another study by Kelley et al. [12]
showed that users were highly concerned about their privacy
especially when sharing location information with corporate-
oriented parties.
Other works were carried out to examine how the em-
ployment of visualization methods may impact users’ attitude
to location privacy and behaviour. Brush et al. [13] studied
users’ attitude towards their location privacy when using GPS
tracking over long periods of time and questioned whether
using some obfuscation techniques can address their concerns.
Participants were concerned about revealing their home, iden-
tity and exact locations. They visually recognised and chose the
best obfuscation techniques they felt can protect their location
privacy. In addition, Tang et al. [14] investigated the extent of
presenting various visualizations of users’ location history on
influencing their privacy concerns when using location-sharing
applications. They developed text-, map-, and time-based vi-
sualization methods and considered spatiotemporal properties
of sharing historical location. They noted that the majority of
participants found visualization of location history to be more
revealing and tended to prefer text-based presentation methods
to limit the amount of data exposed.
With regards to public GeoSNs, there are relatively few re-
search works that examine privacy concerns of users. Lindqvist
et al. [15] considered users’ motivations in using Foursquare
and questioned their privacy concerns. Their analysis showed
that most of the participants had few concerns about their
privacy and users who were more concerned about their
privacy chose not to check into their private residence or to
delay checking into places till after they leave, as a way of
controlling their safety and privacy. A similar observation was
noted by Jin et al. [16], where it was found that users were
generally aware of the privacy of their place of residence and
tended not to provide full home addresses and blocked access
to their residential check-ins to other users.
In summary, it is evident that location privacy presents
a real concern to users in location-sharing applications, and
particularly as they become aware of the data they are pro-
viding. Previous studies may have been limited by several
factors, including the size and representativeness of the sample
user base used in the experiments conducted and the limited
features of the proprietary applications used in testing [6], [7],
[11], [12]. Moreover, as far as we are aware, no studies so
far have considered the problem of location privacy on public
LBSNs.
B. Location-Based Inference from GeoSNs
There are some studies that utilised publicly available
information from GeoSNs in order to derive or predict users’
location. In [17], Twitter users’ city-level locations were es-
timated by only exploiting their tweet contents with which it
was possible to predict more than half of the sample within
100 miles of their actual place. Similarly, Pontes et al. [18]
examined how much personal information can be inferred from
the publicly available information of Foursquare users and
found the home cities of more than two-thirds of the sample
within 50 kilometres. Sadilek et al. [19] investigated novel
approaches for inferring users’ location at any given time by
taking advantage of knowing the GPS positions of their friends
on Twitter. Up to 84% of users’ exact dynamic locations were
derived. Interestingly, Gao et al. [20] formulated predictive
probability of the next check-in location by exploiting social-
historical ties of some Foursquare users. They were able to
predict with high accuracy possible new check-ins for places
that users have not visited before by exploiting the correlation
between their social network information and geographical
distance in LBSNs [21].
Other works focussed on investigating the potential infer-
ence of social relationships between users of GeoSNs. Crandall
et al. [22] investigated how social ties between people can
be derived from spatial and temporal co-occurrence by using
63
International Journal on Advances in Security, vol 7 no 3 & 4, year 2014, http://www.iariajournals.org/security/
2014, © Copyright by authors, Published under agreement with IARIA - www.iaria.org
publicly available data of geo-tagged pictures from Flickr.
They found that relatively limited co-occurrence between
users is sufficient for inferring high probability of social ties.
Sadilek et al. [19] also formulated friendship predictions that
derive social relationships by considering friendship formation
patterns, content of messages of users and their location.
They predicted 90% of friendships with accuracy beyond
80%. Additionally, Scellato et al. [23] investigated the spatial
properties of social networks existing among users of three
popular LBSNs and found that the likelihood of having social
connection decrease with distance. In [24], they developed a
link prediction system for LBSNs by utilising users’ check-
ins information and properties of places. 43% of all new
links appeared between users with at least one check-in place
in common and especially for those who have a friend in
common.
Studying and extracting spatiotemporal movement and ac-
tivity patterns of users on GeoSNs attracted much research in
recent years. Dearman et al. [25] exploited location reviews
on Yelp in order to identify a collection of potential activities
promoted by the reviewed location. They derived the activities
supported by each location by processing the review text
and validated their findings through a questionnaire. Noulas
et al. [26] studied user mobility patterns in Foursquare by
considering popular places and transitions between place cat-
egories. Cheng et al. [27] examined a large scale data set of
users and their check-ins to analyse human movement patterns
in terms of spatiotemporal, social and textual information
associated with this data. They were able to measure user
displacement between consecutive check-ins, distance between
users’ check-ins and their centre of mass, as well as the return-
ing probability to venues. They also studied factors affecting
users’ movement and found considerable relationship between
users’ mobility and geographic and economic conditions. More
recently, Preotiuc-Pietro et al. [28] investigated the behaviour
of thousands of frequent Foursquare users. They analysed
users’ movements including returning probability, check-in
frequency, inter-event time, and place transition among each
venue category. They were also able to group users based
on their check-in behaviour such as generic, businessmen or
workaholics as well as predict users’ future movement. The
above studies show a significant potential for deriving personal
information form GeoSNs and hence also imply the possible
privacy threats to user of these applications. Whereas previous
studies considered mobility and behaviour of large user groups
and determined general patterns and collective behaviour, in
this work we consider the privacy implications for individual
users, with the aim of understanding possible implied user
profiles from location data stored in GeoSNs.
III. DIMENSIONS OF THE LOCATION PRIVACY PROBLEM
ON GEOSNS
Four aspects of the data collected can be identified that
can affect location privacy. These are: 1) the amount of data
collected and its quality, 2) its visibility and accessibility, 3)
its possible utilisation by potential users, and 4) the level of
security offered to users by the application. This discussion
focuses on the type of privacy-related questions that can be
asked and the confidence level in the information that can be
derived. Both factors can affect the degree of privacy concern
to users. The study considers both LBSNs (Foursquare) and
LESNs (Twitter), the difference in the way location data are
acquired in both and the issues implied.
A. Location Data Collection
Here the types of data, its density and quality, as well as
the methods of collection and storage are considered.
1) Method of Collection: Both LBSNs and LESNs depend
on the user device to acquire the user’s current location using
GPS, wireless access points (WAP) or cellular networks. When
using LBSNs, location data are collected automatically since
location is mandatory to providing the service. In Foursquare
specifically, user’s location is implicitly acquired on a contin-
uous basis, even without using the service. User’s check-ins
into specific places are verified against their estimated current
location and recorded explicitly. In LESNs, user’s location data
are collected only when location-based features are enabled
and used. Some features require continuous collection of
location data, for example, when tailoring trends to the user’s
location in Twitter. The mode of data collection, whether
continuous or periodic; automatic or manual, will impact the
volume of data collected and its accuracy, and hence also the
degree of confidence in inferences made from the data.
2) Types of Data: The completeness and accuracy of
location information are primary factors that determine the
possible inferences made based on this information and the
possible privacy threats to users. Three types of data can be
associated with location data collected in GeoSNs: spatial,
non-spatial and temporal.
• Spatial semantics: These refer to any type of informa-
tion that can be used to identify the places visited. In
both LBSNs and LESNs, user’s location is identified
as a point in space with a latitude and longitude.
In LBSNs, users identify their locations explicitly,
allowing for a rich definition of place identity, includ-
ing place name, type classification and street address.
On the other hand, location in LESNs is determined
automatically by reverse geocoding the registered
latitude and longitude coordinates, and thus carry
a degree of inaccuracy and ambiguity. Increasingly,
some LESNs are able to use resources from LBSNs
for defining locations. For instance, Instagram allows
users to geotag their pictures using the Foursquare
API [29]. Twitter also uses Google API for linking
users’ selected place names with a location on a map.
Hence, in both cases it can be assumed that detailed
and precise place identities visited by users may be
stored by the applications.
• Non-spatial semantics: Non-spatial semantics are
other types of data about both users and places that
may be associated with location information. These
include explicit user data, as for example defined in
their personal profiles on the application or place-
related data, such as reviews, tags and pictures. With
the user permission, applications will identify users
and share their personal information. Rich place-
related semantics may also be mined from resources
on the web [30].
• Temporal semantics: These represent the time of user’s
visit to a place and the duration of their visit. In LBSN,
the time of visit is registered by the user as they
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check-in to a place. The user’s physical presence in the
place may be validated by comparing their actual GPS
coordinates with those of the place they check into. In
LESN, a time stamp is encoded with the resource used,
for example, a tweet location. However, in this case it
is difficult to ascertain whether the user is intentionally
visiting the place or happened to be passing by it.
In both cases, further processing of the user tracks is
needed to estimate the duration of the user’s visit.
3) Data Volume: The amount of location data collected is
another important factor to be considered and is dependent of
the user attitude and behaviour when using the application.
The pattern of data logging and the frequency of usage will
determine the density of the data collected over time and will
thus influence the type of information that may be inferred
from the data. For example, regular visits to specific places
can determine routine mobility patterns, while incidental visits
to other places can signify special events or activities.
B. Location Information Accessibility
Location information accessibility represents how much of
the user’s data are available and visible to others including
the user, other users and third parties of the service. In
terms of users’ accessibility to their collected location and
location-related data, GeoSNs provides only limited means for
accessing these kinds of information. In Foursquare, users’
previous check-in information are available in the form of
check-in history, where users can view their visited venues,
dates of visits and tips they made. These raw data provide
only a limited view of the information content in the data, as
discussed in the previous section. In Twitter, users can request
to download their tweet history, but location information are
not included in this data. As for information visibility, most
of the users’ information published on GeoSNs are available
to their friends and can be visible to other users.
Generally, users of GeoSNs have limited control over the
visibility and accessibility of their information by others, since
the privacy settings provided to them is not adequate enough
to manage all aspects of their information accessibility. In
Foursquare, almost all of the user’s information is publicly
available by default and can be viewed by other users. This
include profile information, tips, likes, friends list, photos,
badges, mayorships, and check-ins. Users are only able to
block access to their check-ins and photos by setting their
view to private. Similarly in Twitter, users’ profiles and their
tweets are public by default, and can be accessed by others.
This means that location information attached with tweets is
publicly available as well unless users mark their profile as
private, where only followers can view their data. All of the
publicly available users’ information is accessible by third
parties including the geo-social application APIs users. Third
parties can also have privileges to access the user’s personal
information. In the case of Foursquare, third parties can get
check-in data in anonymous form, but they also indicate that
they will share user’s personal information with their business
partners and whenever is necessary in some situations, such
as enforcement of law. Twitter, on the other hand, states that
any content the user submits or displays through the service
is available to their third parties without anonymity.
C. Location Data Exploitation
Location information exploitation refers to how the
application or third parties can utilise the data and for which
purposes. This dimension involves the actual exploitation of
user’s location and location-related data that lead to posing
various levels of privacy threats. It seems that GeoSNs have
unlimited rights to utilise their users data in any way, for
any purpose as stated in their terms of use. For example,
Foursquare gives itself absolute privileges over using and
manipulating user information as stated in their terms of use
[31].
”By submitting User Submissions on the Site or otherwise through
the Service, you hereby do and shall grant Foursquare a worldwide,
non-exclusive, royalty-free, fully paid, sublicensable and transferable
license to use, copy, edit, modify, reproduce, distribute, prepare
derivative works of, display, perform, and otherwise fully exploit
the User Submissions in connection with the Site, the Service and
Foursquare’s (and its successors and assigns’) business, including
without limitation for promoting and redistributing part or all
of the Site (and derivative works thereof) or the Service in any
media formats and through any media channels (including, without
limitation, third party websites and feeds).”
Similarly, Twitter has the right to utilise users data, includ-
ing location information, in various ways, as stated in their
terms of use [32].
”By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the
Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license
(with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt,
modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any
and all media or distribution methods.”
It is clear therefore that there are no commitments on
GeoSNs as to how the data may be used or shared by the
application or by other parties. In addition, the reasons for the
potential exploitation of users data are vague (e.g., to improve
the services) or even not stated. Hence, by agreeing to the
terms and conditions, users effectively are giving away their
data and unconditional rights to the use of their data to the
application.
D. Location Data Security
Location data security refers to the level of data protection
provided by the application for securing the user’s data against
the risk of loss or unauthorized access. In general, the fact
that data are stored somewhere on servers opens the doors
for potential undeclared access and use, and hence it is
almost impossible to guarantee the security of the user data.
Foursquare declares that the security of users’ information is
not guaranteed and any ”unauthorized entry or use, hardware or
software failure, and other factors, may compromise the secu-
rity of user information at any time”. Without any commitment
to responsibility for data security, the application provider is
declaring the possible high risk of data abuse by any adversary
or even by the application provider themselves. Twitter states
that ”Twitter complies with the U.S.-E.U. and U.S.-Swiss Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles of notice, choice, onward transfer,
security, data integrity, access, and enforcement”, but give no
additional explanation or examples on situations or access
methods that these laws apply to.
In the following section, a sample data set from a LBSN is
used to explore and analyse the potential information content
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that can be derived from the location data.
IV. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
This analysis is carried out using a real-world data set from
Foursquare, as a typical example of a LBSN. The purpose is to
demonstrate possible privacy implications in terms of personal
information inferences and exploitation from user activity on
GeoSNs. The effect of location data density and diversity on
the possible inferences that can be made is analysed.
A. Dataset
The Foursquare dataset used in this analysis is provided
by Jin et al. [16]. The dataset contains venue information
and public check-ins for anonymised users around the wide
area of Pittsburgh, USA from 24 February, 2012 to 22 July,
2012. Places on Foursquare are associated with pre-defined and
structured place categories, e.g., Home, Office, Restaurant, etc.
The data set contains 60,853 local venues, 45,289 users and
1,276,988 public check-ins of these users.
B. Approach and Tools Used
To study the possible impact of location data density on
users’ privacy, users of the dataset were first classified into
groups based on their check-in frequency. A filter was initially
imposed to disregard sparse user activity. Hence, users with
less than five check-ins per month were removed from the
dataset. The rest of the users were categorised into three
groups based on their check-in frequency per day, to moderate,
frequent and hyper-active user groups, as shown in Table I.
One representative user is selected from each group who has
the nearest average check-ins per day to the average check-
ins for the whole group. Table II shows some statistics for the
selected users. The R statistical package was used for analyses
and presentation of results. Mainly, the SQLDF package was
used for querying, linking and manipulating the data and the
ggplot2 package was used for the presentation of the results
of the analysis [33].
C. Results
Analysis of the data set questioned the sort of implicit
user-related information that can be considered to be private
that may be extracted using the location data collected. User’s
spatial location history can be extracted in the form of visits
to venues and the exact times of such visits. The places visited
are identified and described in detail. For example, user7105
visited ’Kohl’s’; a department store, located at latitude 40.5111
and longitude -79.9934 at 9 a.m. on Monday 27/2/2012. The
basic information on venue check-ins can be analysed further
and combined with other semantic information from the user
profile to extract further information that can compromise
user’s privacy. Analysis will investigate the relationship be-
tween users and places visited, their mobility patterns and the
relationships between users and other users as follows.
TABLE I: Statistics of user groups in the Foursquare dataset.
Group Name
Check-ins Range
in Total
Users
Count
Check-ins
Range per
Day
Average
Check-ins
per Day
Moderate Between 50 and 300 4902 0.3 to 2 1.15
Frequent Between 301 and 750 880 2 to 5 3.5
Hyper-active Between 751 and 1303 24 5 to 8.6 6.8
TABLE II: Profiles of selected users.
Factor
Selected Users
User9119 User7105 User2651
Number of total check-ins 144 511 1019
Average check-ins per day 0.96 3.4 6.8
Number of visited venues 21 99 101
Number of visited venues categories 17 47 57
Number of visited venues main categories 10 11 17
Number of friends 20 10 19
• Degree of association between user and place. Re-
lationship with individual place instances as well as
with general place types or categories will be studied.
Elements of interest will include visit frequency, and
possible commuting habits in terms of the association
between the visit frequency of places and their loca-
tion.
• Spatiotemporal movement patterns. Visiting patterns
to individual places or to groups of places can identify
regular movement patterns. In addition, a change of
visit patterns can also be a significant pointer to user
activity.
• Degree of association with other users. Relationship
between users can be derived by studying their move-
ment patterns and analysing their co-occurrence in
place and time.
1) The Moderate User: The analysis results of user9119
selected from the moderate group are as follows.
a) Degree of Association Between User and Place: Two fre-
quently visited venues by user9119 are ’Penn Garrison’
whose category is ’Home’ and ’USX Tower’ whose cate-
gory is ’Office’ representing 44% and 36%, respectively of
the total check-ins. Home and Office are highly sensitive
places, yet they represent 80% of this user’s check-ins.
Other visited place types with significantly less frequency
include, ’Nightlife Spot’: 0.5%, ’Travel & Transport’:
0.27%, and ’Shop & Service’: 0.27%. User9119 is also
interested in ’Hockey’, ’Garden Center’ and ’Museum’
place types. As could be predicted, the location of venues
visited indicates that most of them are close to ’Home’
and ’Office’, whereas this user commutes further away to
visit some less frequent venues such as ’Hockey Arena’.
Figure 1 shows this user’s check-in frequency for different
categories of venues classified by the time of day. As can be
seen from the figure, this user’s association with sensitive
places like home and place of work can be identified. In
addition, a strong association with other place categories is
also evident.
b) Spatiotemporal Movement Patterns: About 40% of this
user’s total check-ins occurs at 9 am, mostly in the ’Office’
and at 7pm, mostly at ’Home’. More than two-thirds of the
check-ins are between 10am and 2pm and between 6pm
and 11pm, which indicates that this user commutes more
frequently during these hours. From the weekly patterns
of movement, it can be seen that 71% of the venues were
visited after 6pm. Mondays and Thursdays are when this
user is most active, representing 41% of the check-ins.
User9119 tends to go to ’Nightlife spots’ more frequently
during working days, whereas visits to other specific place
types occur only at weekends, including, ’Salon or Bar-
bershop’, ’Coffee Shop’ and ’Garden Centre’. This user
66
International Journal on Advances in Security, vol 7 no 3 & 4, year 2014, http://www.iariajournals.org/security/
2014, © Copyright by authors, Published under agreement with IARIA - www.iaria.org
Figure 1: The moderate user’s check-ins count, classified by
the category of venues for different hours of the day.
typically starts commuting earlier on working days and
visits more places than on weekends. Observing the check-
ins by month shows that the months of May and June are
the most active in terms of check-in frequency, comprising
60% of total check-ins, as well as diversity of category
of venues visited (99% of the total visited categories of
venues occurred in those months, including the emergence
of new categories such as ’Museum’, ’Airport’ and ’Hotel’).
The user was least active in April. Figure 2 demonstrates
this user’s check-ins count in different categories of venues,
classified by day and grouped by month. Some changes of
this user’s habits can be noticed as well, which can suggest
a change of personal circumstances. For example, the user
has not visited any Nightlife spots in March and April and
has not checked-in in any place on Sundays of June and
July including ’Home’ and ’Office’. In addition, the user
has not checked in any place for a period of a week between
the 21st and 28th of April. User9119 last check-in before
this week was on the 20th of April at ’Home’. This may
indicate a possible period of time-off work in that week.
c) Degree of Association with Other Users: Co-location is
used here to denote that users have visited the same venue
at the same time. This can be used as a measure of interest
in a place and relationships between users. User9119 was
co-located in 6 unique venue categories with two (out of
twenty) friends. He shared three co-occurrences with two
friends; once with friend1236 at ’American Restaurant’ and
twice with friend15229 at ’Office’, which may indicate that
friend15229 is a colleague at work. In fact, this user shared
95 co-occurrences with 52 other users, 90% of which were
in the ’Office’ suggesting the probability of those users
being work colleagues.
2) The Frequent User: Analysis of results of user7105
from the frequent user group is as follows.
a) Degree of Association between User and Place: Similar
to the moderate user, user7105 most checked-in venue
category is ’Home’, whose location is identified in detail.
However, the second most visited venue is a specific restau-
rant, whose category is ’American Restaurant’, representing
25% of the total check-ins and 28% of category check-ins.
This visit pattern may indicate that this is the user’s work
place. The third most visited venue category for this user is
’Bar’ (4%), that is a subcategory of ’Nightlife Spot’, rep-
resenting about 7% of check-ins. Generally, the third most
visited main category is ’Shop & Service’ corresponding
to 10% of check-ins, where specifically 40% of those are
to ’Gas Station or Garage’ and 25% are to ’Drugstore or
Pharmacy’. User7105 is occasionally interested in visiting
places described as ’Great Outdoors’, ’Professional & Other
Places’ and ’Arts & Entertainment’.
The majority of the most frequently visited venues are
within close distance to ’Home’ and to the ’American
Restaurant’, whereas user7105 commutes further away for
other less frequently visited places, such as, ’Medical
Center’.
b) Spatiotemporal Movement Patterns: Generally, about 20%
of the check-ins occurs from 10am to 12pm, half of which
are at ’Home’. In addition, user7105 tends to move the most
between 3pm and 5pm, representing 23% of his total check-
ins to 46% of the visited venues’ categories. More than
half of the check-ins are at ’Atria’s’, which may indicate
that the user starts his work shift in this place at that
time. This hypothesis can be ascertained by examining his
subsequent check-ins, where 18% of the check-in happens
between 12am and 3am at ’Home’, possibly when the user
comes back from work. There is a high correlation in
terms of place transition between ’Home’ and the ’Amer-
ican Restaurant’. When examining the weekly mobility,
user7105 is more active on Tuesdays followed by Saturdays
corresponding to 19% and 16%, respectively of total check-
ins. Noticeably, the majority of Friday and Tuesday check-
ins occurs at 12am, whereas Monday and Saturday at 4pm.
Furthermore, this user has visited more diverse venues on
Tuesdays followed by Thursdays and Wednesdays repre-
senting 53%, 43% and 38%, respectively of the total visited
categories. During the working week, this user tends to visit
a ’Bar’ (5%), especially on Tuesdays, and ’Gas Station or
Garage’ (4%). This is reasonable considering his working
shifts. While on weekends, ’Grocery or Supermarket’ and
’Drugstore or Pharmacy’ venues are among the top four
visited categories corresponding to 4% and 5%, respectively
of weekends’ check-ins. User7105s check-in patterns were
regular over the whole period. However, visits of this user
are more frequent and diversified in the month of March.
Noticeably, about 28% of the check-ins between 12am
and 3am occurred in March, indicating a possible change
of lifestyle. Figure 3 presents this user’s check-ins count
in different categories of venues, classified by day and
grouped by month.
c) Degree of Association with Other Users: User7105 had co-
locations in 36 unique venues from 19 different categories
with 7 friends. In particular, 26 co-locations are shared
with freind38466 at 14 venues categories including ’Coffee
Shop’, ’Bar’, ’Fast Food Restaurant’ and ’Other Nightlife’.
Co-locations shared with the rest of the friends include
’Bar’, ’Mexican Restaurant’, ’Hospital’ and ’Government
Building’. Moreover, user7105 has 16 spatiotemporal co-
occurrences at 14 unique venues from 6 different cate-
gories with two friends, where 14 co-occurrences with
freind38466 at 6 different categories including mostly
’Bar’, ’American Restaurant’, and ’Sandwich Place’, which
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Figure 2: The moderate user’s check-ins count in different categories of venues, classified by day and grouped by month.
Figure 3: The frequent user’s check-ins count in different categories of venues, classified by day and grouped by month.
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can denote a close friendship between them. The other two
co-occurrences are with friend15995 at ’American Restau-
rant’ on May 13th and June 17th, 2012. The place and
time of this user’s co-occurrences with friends are shown
in Figure 4. Similarly, this user has 89 co-occurrences
with other users, who are not stated as friends, at 29
unique venues, where 38% of these co-occurrences are at
’American Restaurant’ and 24% at ’Plaza’.
3) The Hyper-Active User: The results of analysis for
user2651 selected from the hyper-active user group are as
follows.
a) Degree of Association Between User and Place: The first
most visited venue by this user is a ’Nightlife Spot’
corresponding to 15% of total check-ins. Two ’Home’
venues were recorded, ’My Back Yard’ and ’La Couch’,
representing 23% of the check-ins. Both home venues have
the same location coordinates, implying that they are actu-
ally the same place. ’Automotive Shop’, ’Pool’ and ’Italian
Restaurant’, representing 9%, 8% and 5%, respectively of
this user’s total check-ins indicate the user’s interests and
activities - swimming and Italian food in this case. A
particular instance with a vague category of ’Building’ was
among the top 10 most visited venues. Further investigation
of this venue using the given place name revealed that
this building is a place where an international summit
for creative people is held [34], which may indicate that
user2651 is possibly an active participant of such an event.
When considering the main category of the visited venues,
this user generally visits ’Shop & Service’, ’Nightlife Spot’,
’Arts & Entertainment’ and ’Food’ on a regular basis,
representing 17%, 14%, 11% and 10%, respectively of this
user’s check-ins. User2651 also usually visits ’Gas Station
or Garage’: 4%, and ’Church’: 3%. The location of the
visited venues can be clustered into two main areas on a
map as illustrated in Figure 5. One area includes ’Home’ as
well as other frequently visited venues such as ’Nightlife
Spots’ and ’Gym or Fitness Center’. The other area includes
mostly less frequently visited venues such as ’Hospital’.
Figure 4: Spatiotemporal tracks of the frequent user co-
occurrences with friends.
b) Spatiotemporal Movement Patterns: Overall, 53% of resi-
dential check-ins occurs between 9am and 12pm. A signif-
icant number of check-ins (10%) occur at 2pm, of which
almost two-thirds occur in an ’Automotive Shop’. Check-in
frequency reaches another peak between 11pm and 12am
(18%), of which more than half are in ’Nightlife Spot’.
Noticeably, this user tends to be more active at night, where
about 70% of the check-ins are registered after 6pm. In
his case, weekends have similar check-in frequency as the
working week, but Sundays register as the most active day
in terms of check-in frequency. Moreover, user2651 checks
in considerably less frequently at the ’Automotive Shop’
and the ’Pool’ on Wednesdays and Fridays, but checks in
the ’Automotive Shop’ and ’Nightlife Spot’ in weekends.
This may indicate that he works shifts on weekends.
User2651 has regular check-in patterns over the whole
period. However, in the months of June and July, check-ins
into ’Hotel’ and ’Pool’ significantly increased representing
75% and 60%, respectively of these venues total check-
ins. Figure 6 demonstrates this user’s check-ins count
in different categories of venues, classified by day and
grouped by month.
c) Degree of Association with Other Users: As with other
users, user2651 was co-located with 23 users at 12 dis-
tinct venues, half of these co-occurrences happened in
’Bar’, ’Automotive Shop’ and ’Grocery or Supermarket’.
User2651 is co-located in 27 unique venues from 19
categories with 9 friends, 13 of which are with friend12432
and 9 with friend12046. Most of the co-locations are in
’Nightlife Spots’, ’Gas Station or Garage’, ’Pool’, ’Flower
Shop’ and ’Bar’.
The three dimensions analysed above will form the basis
of the questionnaire design described in the next section.
Figure 5: Coordinates of venues visited by the hyper-active
user, considering the frequency of visit.
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Figure 6: Count of check-ins for the hyper-active user in different categories of venues, classified by day and grouped by month.
V. USER STUDY
None of the related studies reviewed in Section II above has
fully explored or focused on improving users’ full awareness
and understandability of the potential privacy implications
when sharing their location information on GeoSNs. Here,
a survey is undertaken to examine the privacy concerns and
behaviour of users of online social networks, in particular
users’ concerns towards their location information. Three main
aspects are addressed in this study: the extent of users’
awareness of the terms of use they sign up to when using
these applications, their understanding and attitude to potential
privacy implications, and how they may wish to control access
to their personal information on these applications.
A. Study Design
The questionnaire was developed using Google Forms.
Targeted participants were users of online social networking
applications who use location features, e.g., adding location to
their posts and photos and checking-in when visiting places.
A pilot study was first carried out to ensure the clarity and
coherence of the survey. Four volunteers with no specific back-
ground completed the survey and provided valuable feedback
into the wordings and layout of the questions used. The survey
was then disseminated widely within the university to staff and
students and was also advertised on social networks through
the author’s account. A token incentive of £10 Amazon
vouchers was offered to ten randomly chosen participants who
completed the survey.
The questionnaire consists of four main sections. The first
section collects background information on the participants
and their use of GeoSNs. The next section examines users’
knowledge of terms of use and privacy policies of the applica-
tions, followed by a section on studying perception of possible
inferences of personal information. The last section is intended
to capture users’ attitude to privacy on social networks as well
as their attitude to controlling their personal information.
B. Results
The questionnaire data were analysed using the R statistical
package and the results are presented below. 186 participants
completed the survey of which 60% are young adults in the
age group 15-24, divided almost equally between males and fe-
males. The vast majority of participants (77%) use the services
frequently (several times a day) and 72% of participants use the
location services in GeoSNs. About 60% use location features
on only one application. Adding locations to posts and pictures
on Facebook was the most used application, corresponding
to 47% of the total number of location services used. This
is followed by adding location to tweets on Twitter, photo
mapping pictures on Instagram, and checking-in on Foursquare
representing 17% ,16% and 10%, respectively as illustrated
in Figure 7. In addition, most of the users noted that they
’sometimes’ use geosocial applications with almost a fifth of
users ’always’ using the location services. Foursquare users
are more frequent users of the service than other services and
25% of the users have linked their accounts on different social
networking applications. The questionnaire is divided up into
four sections, was presented to participants in whole and takes
roughly about 10 minutes to complete.
In what follows, the results from the different sections of
the questionnaire are analysed.
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Figure 7: Percentage of the type of location services used by
the 186 participants.
1) Knowledge of Terms of Use and Privacy Policies for
Social Networking Applications: Here, the awareness of the
terms of use and privacy policies are examined and analysed
against users’ profiles. In general, the majority of the users
(81%) have not read terms of use or privacy policies of the
social networking applications they use. Users were presented
with the following typical statements representing the terms of
use relating to location information and were asked to indicate
whether they are aware of the information in the statements.
Note that the following statements are representative of the
terms of use of all the GeoSNs in question. The results are
shown in Figure 8 grouped by the frequency of use.
• Term 1: The application collects and stores your
precise location (as a place name and/or a GPS
point), even if you mark your location as private, for
a possibly indefinite amount to time.
• Term 2: The application can use your location infor-
mation in any way possible including sharing it with
other applications or partners for various purposes
(commercial or non-commercial).
• Term 3: If you share your location information, your
friends and any other users are able to access and use
it in any way possible.
• Term 4: The application can collect other personal
information, such as your personal profile information
and browsing history from other web applications.
More than half (53%) of users acknowledged awareness of
all of the statements and of those 73% have read the terms and
policies. Most users (75%) are aware of statement 3, relating
to the sharing of information with friends, but are generally
unaware of statements 1 and 4, relating to how their location
and other information may be collected and stored by the
applications. It is interesting to note that frequent users of such
application are generally unaware of such statements (49%) as
demonstrated in Figure 8. Younger users aged between 15 and
34 tend to be more knowledgeable of these polices (60%), but
gender does not seem to be a factor in these results.
2) Perceptions of Possible Privacy Implications: In this
section, users’ attitude towards the inference by the application
of personal information is examined. In particular, the ques-
tions aim to gauge users’ awareness of plausible inferences
about their private places, activities at different times, their
connections to other users, and possible knowledge of this
Figure 8: Users’ awareness of general terms and policies of
GeoSNs (Term1-Term4) grouped by the frequency of use.
information by the application. Participants were presented
with 14 statements, shown below. They were then asked to
indicate, for each statement, whether they are aware that
the statement is possible and to score their reaction to the
possibility of this statement as either ’OK’, ’Uncomfortable’ or
’Very Worried’. The first twelve statements refer to knowledge
by the application itself, while the last two statements are
reflection of the terms of use that suggest that the application
can share the user’s data with other users and third parties.
• S1: I can guess where your home is.
• S2: I can guess where your work place is.
• S3: I know which places you visit and at what times.
• S4: I can tell where you normally go and what you
do in your weekends.
• S5: I can tell you where you go for lunch or what you
do after work.
• S6: I know your favourite store (your favourite restau-
rant, your favourite coffee shop, etc.)
• S7: I can guess what you do when you are in a specific
place.
• S8: I can guess when you are AWAY from home.
• S9: I can guess when you are OFF work.
• S10: I know who your friends are.
• S11: I know when and where you meet up with your
friends.
• S12: I can guess which of your friends you see most.
• S13: Other people can know where you are at any
point in time.
• S14: Other people can know what you are doing at
any point in time.
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In terms of awareness, users seem to be most aware
of statements S1, S2 and S10, regarding the location of
home, place of work and friends, representing 88%, 89%
and 93%, respectively. On the other hand, users are least
aware of statements S5, S13 and S14 that relate to other
users’ knowledge of personal mobility patterns and activities,
representing 34%, 37% and 40%. The awareness level of the
users is demonstrated in Figure 9 grouped by the frequency of
use.
Despite a reasonable level of awareness about the plau-
sibility of these statement, users seemed to be relatively
concerned about their privacy. 66% of users’ reactions were
either uncomfortable (41%) or ’very worried’ (25%) as can
be seen in Figure 10(a). Over half of the responses to S2
(awareness of workplace-53%) and S10 (awareness of friends-
65%) were not concerned.
On the other hand, participants were most concerned with
S13 and S14, with the ’Very Worried’ category scoring 83%
and 84%, respectively. S1 and S11, relating to the location of
home and meetings with friends were rated most ’Uncomfort-
able’ corresponding to 53% and 51%, respectively. Statement
S8, suggesting the knowledge of user’s absence from home and
S13, indicating the possible knowledge of this information by
other people presented a significant source of worry to users,
with 45% and 42%, respectively indicating that they are ’Very
Worried’ about these statements.
It appears that users who read the terms and polices are
more aware (by 9%) of the statements, while users who
have not read the terms and polices were significantly ’Very
Worried’ (by 21%) than other users. Moreover, there is a
positive correlation between the age of the participant and their
level of awareness; level of awareness considerably increases
with increase in age group, with the oldest active age group
(35 to 44 years) scoring 89%. Yet, younger users, in the age
group 15 to 34 years, tend to be relatively less concerned than
older users (by 4%). The level of users’ concern increases with
the decrease in the frequency of use of the applications, where
76% of occasional users are concerned compared to 63% of
frequent users. Users of Facebook and Instagram registered the
highest degree of concern among all users of GeoSNs scoring
63% and 62%, respectively as shown in Figure 10(b). Again,
gender does not seem to have any significant influence in this
study.
3) Attitude to Privacy on Social Networks: The aim of this
section of the questionnaire is to understand the users’ reaction
with regards to using the applications, given the knowledge of
potential implications on privacy from the previous section.
61% of users stated that they would change the way they
share their location information, 55% of whom are willing to
stop sharing their location information completely, with the rest
of the group indicating they would share it less often. Frequent
users seem to be the most motivated to change their sharing
behaviour (13% more than infrequent users), as illustrated in
Figure 11, but they are also less willing to stop sharing the
information and would prefer to share less frequently than
the infrequent users (by 47%). Interestingly, users of location
services are more tempted (by 10%) to change how they
disclose their location information compared to users who
have not used them. 57% of the first group of users want
to share their location less frequently and 43% are willing to
Figure 9: Users’ awareness about potential information infer-
ences (S1-S14) grouped by frequency of use of GeoSNs.
discontinue disclosing their location data. Younger users (15-
34) are more willing to change their usage behaviour (by an
average of 18%) and are even more willing to stop sharing
location information completely (by an average of 10%) than
older users. In this case, it seems that female users are more
motivated to change their attitude regarding location disclosure
(by 11%) than males, yet 60% of male participants suggested
their willingness to discontinue using location services.
4) Managing Personal Information: In this section, users’
views on managing and controlling access to their location
information are explored. This includes several aspects related
to what information is stored, how it is shared or viewed by the
application and by others, and whether users need to manage
access to their information. The following statements were
presented to the participants who were asked to rate how often
they would use them: ’All the time’, ’Occasionally’ or ’Never’.
• C1: I would like to be able to turn off location sharing
for specific durations of time.
• C2: I would like to turn off location sharing when I
visit specific types of places.
• C3: I would like to decide how much of my location
information history is stored and used by the applica-
tion for example use only my check-in history for the
last 7 days.
• C4: I would like to see the predicted personal infor-
mation that the application stores about me based on
my location information.
• C5: I would like to decide how people see my current
location for example, exact place name, or a rough
indication of where I am.
• C6: I would like to decide who can download my
location information data.
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(a) (b)
Figure 10: (a) Users’ reaction towards potential inferences grouped by the inference statements (S1-S14). (b) Data in (a) grouped
by the GeoSNs used.
• C7: I would like to know, and control, which informa-
tion can be shared with other Web applications.
• C8: I would like to make my location information
private seen only by myself and by the people I
choose.
Results are given in Figure 12(a) and show a significant
desire to use these controls for location privacy. Overall, 76%
of participants would like to apply those controls ’All the
time’, 20% are happy to apply them ’Occasionally’, and only
4% of users will not consider these controls.
In general, C2, C6, C7 and C8 were most favoured controls,
scoring over 97% each of users’ responses. Controls C1, C6
and C7 were the most chosen controls to be applied all the
time, representing 91%, 88% and 86% of users’ responses,
respectively. It is worth noting that users of different loca-
tion services have similar acceptance rate for these control.
Foursquare and Facebook users have the highest preference
for applying the controls ’All the Time’, corresponding to 76%
and 75%, respectively.
A negative correlation appears to exist between users’
tendency to use these privacy controls all the time and their
age group. The youngest active age group of 15-24 years old
has the highest desire for all-the-time application of controls
representing 78% of this group’s responses.
Figure 11: Users’ attitude to location privacy risk, grouped by
frequency of use of GeoSNs.
As expected, users who are tempted to change their location
sharing behaviour have relatively higher motivation to use
these controls representing 97% of this group’s responses (4%
higher than users who are reluctant to change). The factors
of gender, whether users read the applications’ terms or how
frequent they use the social networks, as shown in Figure
12(b), seem to have minimal influence on their willingness to
use these controls. In the future it will be useful to undertake
a longitudinal study that tracks user behaviour over time to
understand the factors that may influence their attitude to
location privacy, for example the impact of friends and age
group.
VI. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The proliferation of location-based GeoSNs and the large-
scale uptake by users suggest the urgency and importance of
studying privacy implications of personal information collected
by these networks. Identifying user profiles is a goal of many
businesses that is now commonly accepted by users for the
purpose of improving the quality of service. However, GeoSNs
do not explicitly present similar business goals and thus
their motivations for collecting and sharing personal location
information are not clear. Also, the issue is complicated as the
data collected may be shared or accessed by other users and
applications. The results of this study highlight the possible
implications to user privacy and the need for developing means
for raising the user awareness of these issues, and possibly also
giving the user control on managing access to their data.
The data analysis experiment conducted here shows the
amount and types of personal information that can be inferred
using location data. Users’ spatiotemporal mobility tracks can
be analysed to identify where they are, where they are likely
to be, and sometimes more significantly, where they are not
present. Tracking user location data may also give indications
to their preferred activities, places, habits and friendship com-
munity.
As can be expected, the more frequent the applications are
used, the more dense the spatiotemporal history of user data
collected and the more certainty in the derived information
extracted from this data. Whilst the statistical analysis carried
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(a) (b)
Figure 12: (a) Users’ desire to use location privacy controls grouped by statement of controls C1-C8 (see section V-B4). (b)
Data in (a) grouped by frequency of use of GeoSNs.
out in this study highlight some of the basic and interesting
inferences that can be made, more sophisticated location-based
inference methods can be developed to infer, for example,
the probability of future movements, methods of transport
and places visited. The now common practice of linking user
accounts in several GeoSNs increases the availability of data
and compounds the privacy risks to users, who sign up to
different, possibly contradicting, terms of use and policies of
different applications. For example, developers now use the
Twitter API to collect user check-ins in Foursquare.
The questionnaire conducted in Section V provides valu-
able insights that convey many aspects of location privacy on
the Social Web from the perspective of the end user. The main
and (possibly only) means of communicating how the collected
user information may be used and exploited by the application
is described in the application’s terms of use. It is clear from
the results of the questionnaire undertaken that the majority
of users, especially those who use location services, do not
read the terms of use and policy documents. The findings
also indicate that users are aware of the potential information,
and possible derivatives thereof, stored by the application.
However, it appears that they are also quite concerned about
the privacy implications. This apparently contradicting findings
may be due to that such awareness and concerns are evident
when users are actively questioned about these issues, but
are somewhat screened from the users’ minds during the
continuous use of the application. The study also suggests
that users may not fully understand the privacy implications,
where their level of concern was much more pronounced when
faced with statements that indicate that other people may be
aware of their location information in comparison to statements
indicating that the application holds such information.
The study reveals that there is a strong need for the users to
be continuously aware of their data, how it is stored and to have
the ability to control access to and visibility of their location
data sets. Further research is needed into methods that enhance
the communication of the information by the applications as
well as method to allow users to better understand and control
their personal profiles on such networks.
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